

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION NEA-07

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2448

INFO AMEMBASSY DOHA

AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

S E C R E T AMMAN 4092

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGOV, PBOR, JO, XF

SUBJECT: KING HUSSEIN'S GULF VISIT

1. WHEN I SAW KING HUSSEIN BRIEFLY ON JULY 20, HE TOLD ME OF HIS TRIP TO GULF DURING PAST TWO DAYS. HE SAID THAT IN KUWAIT AND BAHRAIN HE SPECIFICALLY DID NOT ASK FOR ASSISTANCE. IN EACH STOP HE EXPLAINED HIS VIEW OF AREA SITUATION AND PEACE PROSPECTS. ALL OF THE RULERS AGREED WITH HIM ABOUT THE CENTRALITY OF THE US POSITION AND THE NEED FOR THE US TO KEEP THE PEACE PROCESS GOING. WHAT MADE THE GULF RULERS SIT UP AND TAKE NOTICE, HUSSEIN SAID, WAS WHEN THE JORDANIANS REPORTED TO THEM ABOUT THE ISRAELI "INCURSIONS" (OVERFLIGHTS) OVER TABUK IN SAUDI ARABIA.

2. IN KUWAIT HE NOTED HE HAD FOUND MORE UNDERSTANDING THAN PREVIOUSLY. SEVERAL GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED PAPERS HAD NICE ARTICLES ABOUT JORDAN AND HOW WELL JORDAN HAD DEVELOPED AND USED THE AID GIVEN TO IT. I ASKED IF HE THOUGHT THAT KUWAITIS WERE EXPECTING

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A REQUEST FOR AID. HE SAID YES THEY WERE AND THEY CHEERED UP CONSIDERABLY WHEN I LET THEM KNOW THAT I HAD NO SUCH REQUESTS IN MIND.

3. HE HAD LITTLE TO SAY ABOUT BAHREIN EXCEPT THAT RELATIONS ARE EXTREMELY CLOSE AND THAT HE FOUND VERY FULL UNDERSTANDING.

4. IN QATAR HE DID ASK FOR FINANCIAL HELP TELLING THE RULER ABOUT HIS CURRENT MONEY PROBLEMS. HE DID NOT ASK FOR A SPECIFIC SUM OR PUSH A SPECIAL PROJECT BUT LET THEM KNOW ANYTHING THEY COULD DO WOULD BE HELPFUL.

5. IN ABU DHABI, WHICH HE CALLED THE TOUGHEST OF HIS STOPS, SHEIKH ZAYYID WAS PLEASANT AND INTERESTED. ZAYYID, THE KING SAID, LET SLIP A STATEMENT WHICH MADE IT CLEAR THAT SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT, QATAR AND THE EMIRATES ALL COORDINATE CLOSELY AND INFORMALLY THEIR STRATEGY ON GIVING. HE SAID HE WAS PARTICULARLY FED UP BECAUSE IT WAS IMMEDIATELY CLEAR TO HIM THAT THE SAUDIS WERE THE SENIOR PARTNERS AND THAT THE SAUDIS HAD URGED HIM TO MAKE THIS TRIP TO THE GULF FOR THE PURPOSE OF SOLICITING AID.

6. WHAT FOLLOWED WAS A LAMENT THAT ALL THE TIME HE HAD SPENT WITH FAHD DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE DONE MUCH GOOD. FAHD HAD THE POWER NOW. BUT FAHD HAD ALWAYS SAID TO HIM WHAT HE HAD WANTED TO SAY TO FAHD AND BEFORE HE HAD A CHANCE TO DO SO. HE THEN NOTED THAT ASHRAF MARWAN HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT EGYPT WAS GETTING VERY LARGE AMOUNTS OF AID FROM THE SAUDIS AND THE GULF. MARWAN HAD JUST BEEN IN ABU DHABI LOOKING FOR A BILLION DOLLARS FOR THE EGYPTIAN NAVY. THE KING IMPLIED THAT THE EGYPTIANS WERE SATISFIED WITH WHAT THEY HAD RECEIVED FOR THEIR ARMY AND AIR FORCE AND WERE NOW MOVING ON TO THE NAVY.

6. THE END OF ALL OF THIS WAS THAT KING FELT NOW HE HAD TO
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GET FAHD TO JORDAN FOR A TRIP AND SHOW HIM THE REALITIES. THE SAUDIS HE CONCLUDED BOTH FAVORED A PLO STATE ON THE WEST BANK AND KEEPING JORDAN ON AS SHORT RATIONS AS POSSIBLE. THE SAUDIS HAD WANTED JORDAN TO BE "POSITIVE" AND JORDAN HAD BEEN SO. THEY DID NOT LIKE THE SYRIAN CONNECTION AND JORDAN HAD SLOWED THAT ALL DOWN. THEY SAUDIS DID NOT REALIZE WHAT A DANGER A PLO STATE WOULD BE TO THEM, PARTICULARLY IF JORDAN WERE WEAKENED. HE SAID HE HAS DECIDED TO SEND DOWN A COUPLE OF COURT OFFICIALS TO TALK TO THE SAUDIS AND IS PREPARING HIS NEXT TALK WITH THEM (HE SAID "POLITELY OF COURSE") TO EXPLAIN WHAT IS WRONG WITH THEIR PRESENT ATTITUDE.
PICKERING

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